The nature and offices of Pity and Courteſy:

CONSIDER'D IN

TWO DISCOURSES

Preach'd before the

Univerſity of CAMBRIDGE.

BY

JOHN MAINWARING, B. D.

Fellow of St. JOHN's College.

LONDON,

Printed for J. WHISTON and B. WHITE, in *Fleet-ſtreet*; and W. THURLBOURN and J. WOODYER, in *Cambridge*.

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TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

THOMAS Lord *HYDE.*

My Lord,

THE world will not be ſurpriz'd that the Author of theſe Diſcourſes ſhould be deſirous of obtaining your Lordſhip's Patronage, when the Subject of them is conſider'd. And he hopes your Lordſhip will not be diſpleas'd with his taking this firſt opportunity of publicly declaring the high regard, with which he has the honour to be

Your Lordſhip's moſt oblig'd,

And moſt obedient Servant.

1 PETER iii. 8. laſt part.

——— *be pitiful, be courteous.*

NOTWITHSTANDING the many clear and undoubted marks of wiſdom and goodneſs which are found in all thoſe parts of the creation, of which we have any knowledge; it muſt be confeſs'd, that the preſent world, from the very ſettlement and condition of it, abounds with miſery: and that men, inſtead of prudently availing themſelves of thoſe remedies which Nature has, in pity, provided againſt the numberleſs evils to which they are neceſſarily expos'd; have, by their own miſmanagement and perverſeneſs, added to them numberleſs others which might be avoided. Conſidering alſo how many cauſes and accidents muſt needs have ariſen in the courſe of the world, capable of deſtroying that natural

equality which ſeems to have been intended between the ſeveral individuals of the ſame ſpecies; and conſequently, how few can be found among them, whoſe welfare is not more or leſs dependent on the will, or humour, or caprice of others: conſidering how much eaſier it is in general to injure or obſtruct, than to improve or promote human happineſs; — who can believe that the great and common Parent of all would have ſo little tenderneſs for his offspring, as to leave them in a world thus conſtituted, without ſome better defence and ſtronger ſecurity than that of Reaſon? If this faculty ſtood in need of as little culture and improvement, as the ſeveral appetites and inſtincts of our nature; or if, when moſt cultivated and improved, it were found to act as uniformly, and operate as invariably as they do; — to purſue and embrace the ſeveral truths preſented to *it*, with the ſame readineſs and certainty that they do the objects which are ſuited to *them*; — it would have ſome right to thoſe ſounding titles, which the zeal of its admirers have beſtowed upon it. But 'twould be ill truſting to the rigid ſcrutinies of

of ſuch a principle, as thoſe who poſſeſs it in its greateſt perfection, are often much more famous for the juſtneſs of their concluſions, than for the tenderneſs and delicacy of their perceptions. The cauſes of this may perhaps appear as we advance in our enquiries. At preſent it will be more pertinent to obſerve how admirably both the accidental and the neceſſary defects of Reaſon, are ſupplied by the active, uniform, inſtinctive principle of Pity. For by giving to all men this principle, and placing them in a ſtate of mutual dependency, God hath plainly conſtituted 'em the guardians and protectors of each other's welfare; hath made their own natural feelings and conſcious expectations, the rule and meaſure of their mutual dealings. This ſoft and tender affection is accordingly found ſo eſſential an ingredient in the compoſition of our nature, that the abſence or excluſion of it is term'd inhumanity; a word which carries with it the deepeſt diſgrace and infamy. For it marks the oppoſition, the violence, and even outrage which nature ſuffers before it can take place. But if ſo, what can be the rea-

ſon that the Poets and Orators and Divines of every age and country have employ'd all the powers of argument and eloquence, to awaken the tender affections, nay, to keep them alive? The anſwer is, that the refined pleaſures annexed to ſuch an employment, is a ſufficient reaſon for their chuſing it; and that all their art and labour might well have been ſpar'd, in any other view, had Nature been left to her own generous impulſe, and virtuous emotions. But when once, under the notion of regulating and directing, men had learnt to over-rule and ſuppreſs them; when, inſtead of leading the pure current into its proper channels, they had contriv'd to dry up the very ſource from whence it ſprung; — then it was that Intereſt under the maſk of Reaſon, began to diſpute the claims of the wretched; and that one inſtance of ill-placed pity, was deem'd an excuſe for a hundred acts of barefac'd cruelty. Intereſt, or paſſion may put men upon acts of this kind, and theſe acts by degrees may be form'd into habits. And 'twere well if certain Nations, among the moſt civiliz'd, in other reſpects, were more ſenſible of this danger.

danger. The verieſt ſavages can hardly equal them in the manner of puniſhing offenders againſt religion, or the ſtate. Nor is it any excuſe to ſay, that, for the ſafety of ſociety, actions muſt be puniſh'd with a ſeverity proportion'd to the guilt they carry; and that treaſon, joined with an intention or attempt to murther, is one of the moſt guilty that can be. For tho' all this be true, yet is any one ſo *much* a member of the community, as to forget that he is a man? Or does ſound policy require, that the celeſtial Juſtice ſhould be transform'd into an infernal Fury, and employ'd, in a Chriſtian country, in torturing malefactors by arts and inventions, which are truly diabolical? For tho' men may forfeit their claim to the benefits of ſociety, and by infringing its laws, may ceaſe to be a part of the community; yet never can they forfeit all pretenſions to pity and benevolence, becauſe they can never ceaſe to be a part of the human ſpecies. Beſides, no end whatever can warrant the uſe of abſurd, or unnatural means: and ſuch muſt the puniſhments in queſtion for ever be believ'd, unleſs it can be ſhewn, that they

have

have at leaſt as much efficacy to prevent crimes, as they certainly have to extinguiſh humanity.

As errours and corruptions in religion and government may account for theſe inſtances of national cruelty, ſo thoſe of education may generate in particulars the ſame barbarous ſpirit. But ſuppoſing ſuch tempers could *not* be accounted for, yet who would argue from the natural, or acquir'd hardneſs and inſenſibility of a few miſcreants, to the temper and texture of the whole ſpecies? A Nero, or a Caligula, are in reality not the rule of nature, but the exception to it. We can as little judge from *them* of what was intended in the kind; as from a Meſſalina, or any other anomalous character of the ſame caſt, of what was intended in the ſex. In ſpite of any ſuch inſtances, which were they more common, would be leſs notic'd, the verieſt caviller muſt admit, unleſs he is ſtout enough to combat conviction, that Benevolence and Pity are qualities as proper to the whole ſpecies, as Modeſty and Chaſtity are peculiar to the one half of it.

'Tis

'Tis true the hiſtory and aſpect of the world ſeems but ill to accord with this favourable character of its chief inhabitants: among whom there are abundantly more inſtances of corruption and miſery, than of innocence and happineſs. But notwithſtanding theſe untoward appearances, which ariſe from the very nature of liberty and virtue, an exact and thorough enquiry into the formation of the human mind would convince every unprejudiced perſon, that all thoſe qualities, which are truly original and inherent, are beneficial and ſalutary; and that ſuch as are of a contrary tendency, are adventitious and accidental. Much, you will ſay, it ſignifies to the poor ſufferers, whether the authors of their miſery ow'd their cruel diſpoſitions to nature, to art, or to accident. — More than at firſt ſight may be imagin'd. Is it not of infinite conſequence to the world, and ought it not to be matter of ſome comfort to *them*, that, from the very conſtitution of the human mind, Cruelty is inconſiſtent with its peace and tranquillity, and in ſome degree muſt ever carry with it its own puniſhment? — that Pity, on the other hand,

is as duly attended with that ſelf-approbation, and conſciouſneſs of deſert, which proves it to be the genuine and uniform tendency of pure, uncorrupted nature? For tho', for more reaſons than may be known to us, 'tis not inconſiſtent with God's natural government of the world to permit one man to be the author or inſtrument of another's miſery; yet every act by which innocence is injur'd, being done in open oppoſition to his will, as moral governour, and in direct violation of that law which he hath written on the hearts of his creatures; — it ſurely is a matter of the utmoſt importance, that every ſuch act, while it expoſes the doer to his vengeance, places the ſufferer under his more immediate patronage and protection. And this it muſt do, from the very nature of God, and his eſſential attributes. For to doubt of his Compaſſion, of which every man carries within his own breaſt the moſt evident proofs, would be juſt as conſiſtent with reaſon and common ſenſe, as to doubt of his power and intelligence, of which the univerſe contains ſuch numberleſs and undeniable inſtances. When he was pleaſed to

fix

place us in this ſtate of trial, to render it the more ſupportable, he gave men ſocial and benevolent affections. And when he is pleaſed to admoniſh them by the mouth of his inſpir'd Apoſtle to be pitiful, or compaſſionate, it is only referring 'em to their own ſenſe and apprehenſion; to thoſe very feelings with which he has impreſs'd, to thoſe very faculties with which he has endow'd, them. But ſince every age and country has produced monſters in a human form, who have ſtifled thoſe feelings, and abuſed thoſe faculties to the injury and ruin of their fellow-creatures; ſuch an authoritative and direct declaration of his Will in this important particular, was highly needful to invigorate the feeble efforts of nature and reaſon. As it muſt have been the object of every good man's wiſh, ſo it was a freſh inſtance of that tranſcendent Pity, which had a condemn'd world for its noble object. In conſequence of this declaration, thoſe ruthleſs and atrocious maxims ſo commonly practiſed heretofore by nations at war with each other, are now ſcarce ever heard of. Much leſs do we hear of infants, openly devoted to de-

ſtruction by their own parents, ſometimes from the blind impulſe of ſuperſtition, oftener from the mercenary motives of convenience, or the fooliſh prepoſſeſſions of fancy: — of men, the daring, deliberate, remorſeleſs contrivers of their own deſtruction, on almoſt any occaſion of diſappointment, or ſubject of diſtaſte: — of * ſlaves and dependents without number, whoſe limbs and lives were no longer ſound or ſafe, than their good luck, or happy genius ſhould enable them to hit the taſte and gratify the humour of ſottiſh or tyrannical maſters: — of ſtates, the moſt renown'd for their wiſe laws and excellent inſtitutions, who plac'd their higheſt entertainment and diverſion in ſeeing the blood of their own citizens wantonly ſpilt

* Among the Greeks and Romans the right of puniſhment being lodged in the hands of private perſons, the only meaſure of the injury or offence, was, the reſentment of the party injur'd or offended. Nothing can be more deſtructive of humanity and tenderneſs, than the unlimited indulgence of ſuch a paſſion. What then can we think of laws, which not only overlook'd and permitted, but approved and authoriſed its utmoſt irregularities and exceſſes? Among the numberleſs benefits we owe to Chriſtianity, this is one, that the exorbitant demands of private reſentment are now moderated by the impartial decrees of public juſtice.

upon

upon public ſtages, and the moſt valuable lives frequently ſacrific'd to their criminal curioſity. Notwithſtanding the ſubtle arts which have been uſed by the fond admirers of antiquity to palliate and gloſs over theſe glaring inſtances of cruelty, by which its faireſt and brighteſt periods are thus ſadly ſullied and obſcured; men of plain underſtandings will eaſily collect from them the ſtate of humanity before the Goſpel, and the wonderful improvements this principle has received in conſequence of its publication.

Upon the whole, that the natural obligations to Pity are exceedingly ſtrengthened by Revelation; and that the direct proofs of Revelation derive additional force and clearneſs from this implanted Affection; that the human Mind is form'd for thoſe excellent purpoſes which the Goſpel aims at; that, when ſeparately view'd, both have the marks of divine workmanſhip ſo ſtrong upon them; and that, when compar'd together, each carries this appearance ſtill ſtronger, by its perfect conformity, and exact agreement with the other; — by that light which it

lends, by that teſtimony which it bears to it;——theſe are truths as certain, as they are ſatisfactory.

From the foregoing obſervations it is evident, that the end and office of Pity is, to leſſen the miſeries of life. And from the following it will be found, that the end and office of Courteſy is, to leſſen the inconveniences of ſociety.

It is eaſy to imagine the numberleſs competitions and interferences which muſt needs ariſe among perſons aſſembled and united for their mutual defence and ſecurity; and, for the ſake of order and tranquillity, conſenting to be governed by the ſame laws. Theſe indeed may regulate and decide the more momentous controverſies about right and property; but in thoſe which relate to mere pleaſure and convenience, leſs important indeed, but often not leſs violent than the other, every man muſt be left to his own feelings, and govern'd by his own diſcretion. 'Tis true that certain rules or modes of behaviour have been invented and approv'd, with

with a view to obviate the very inconveniences of which we are now ſpeaking. But in the firſt place, theſe rules muſt often be ineffectual, from their having no penalties to guard, or ſanctions to enforce them. All men have not a ſenſe of ſhame, and meanneſſes any may commit with impunity. In the next place, highly uſeful as they are within their ſphere of operation, they can be of *no* uſe any farther than they extend; and they muſt, from the very nature of 'em, be chiefly confin'd to thoſe who are rais'd above the common level, and act in the higher characters. Politeneſs is, at beſt, but the virtue of a few; and is often but a borrow'd quality, to nothing more unlike and oppoſite, than to natural Civility.

But Courteſy, even in its beſt acceptation, if conſider'd as a mere Civil accompliſhment, or artificial excellence, is no part of our preſent enquiry. What the Apoſtle means, and what the original word imports, is a quality common to all mankind; a pure ſentiment of nature, improv'd into a moral, and Chriſtian principle: —— A deſire to pleaſe,

pleaſe, and a diſpoſition to be pleas'd with, not only thoſe, who may happen to be of our own colour or perſuaſion, but with whom we have any intercourſe, commerce, or connexion: — A deſire, which has not the leaſt affinity, which diſclaims all kindred, with that ſelfiſh and ſervile ſpirit of compliance, or that practis'd and inſipid complaiſance, which conſtitute the whole of good-nature with ſome perſons: and which differs as widely from that paſſive approbation, that vague and indiſcriminate aſſent, which paſſes with others for the whole of good manners.

As indifference is an affection of the mind plac'd, as it were, in the middle point between friendſhip and enmity, ſo this of Courteſy ſeems to hold the middle place between indifference and friendſhip; being neither capable of thoſe languors and negligences, which belong to the firſt; nor ſubject to thoſe ſtrong and noted preferences, which are included in the laſt. The object of it is the eaſe and comfort of all that come within the reach of its influence. I know it is uſually ſuppos'd that the ſocial virtues may

all

all be refer'd to benevolence, and are included under it. But this notion, however generally it may have been receiv'd, is hardly conſiſtent either with reaſon or experience. For ſurely a man may be very friendly, and very benevolent, without being courteous; a natural ſhyneſs, and a rooted reſerve being often blended with thoſe beſt of qualities. But ſhyneſs and reſerve, however temper'd and alleviated by a latent humanity, will ſtill differ from Courteſy, as much as they do from a latent pride, of which they are often moſt injuriouſly ſuſpected.

It may be difficult to give a complete deſcription of this truly amiable and ſocial affection. When fully unfolded and develop'd, it ſhould ſeem to include the following particulars,

" An habitual attention to ſuch qualities in other men, as are any way amiable, or praiſe-worthy, with an endeavour to make them appear to the beſt advantage: a readineſs to excuſe or alleviate their defects, join'd with a happy or judicious manner of diſguiſing

ſing its own ſuperiority, and of declining the honour which is due to it."

It is true that to poſſeſs the quality in this its higheſt ſtage of improvement, not only a good education, and great talents are preſuppos'd, but likewiſe ſome natural delicacy of taſte and ſentiment. However, if all are not capable of pleaſing alike, all are alike capable of deſiring to pleaſe: ſo that any defect as to the power, may be amply made up by the evidence and force of the inclination: an inclination, which when it is honeſt, and ſincere, muſt ever carry with it the ſtrongeſt merit, and the ſureſt ſucceſs. It extorts even from the worſt of men what little love and eſteem they are capable of conceiving; and almoſt diſarms their hatred, when it is moſt furious. It removes or abates that envy and jealouſy, which are uſually provok'd by ſuperiority, or eminence of almoſt every kind. It renders the want of ſuch advantages leſs ſenſible by ſecuring the avenues to eſteem. It ſoftens the ſeverity of Reaſon, and corrects the exorbitancy of Self-love. Theſe effects of it deſerve to be

particularly examin'd; at preſent however I ſhall only add, that if there was no other reaſon for cultivating that lovely temper, which delights in miniſtring to the ſatisfaction of all about us; the neceſſity of it to our own happineſs ſhould be an argument, which nothing can reſiſt. For without this ſpirit, tho' a man were as wiſe and as virtuous as Solomon or Socrates; nay, tho' all the great perſonal qualities both of body and mind, which were ever ſhar'd among the moſt illuſtrious of the ſons of men, were met and concentred in him alone; — yet without Courteſy, he could never pleaſe; without pleaſing, he could never be belov'd, and without being belov'd, he could never be happy.

1 PETER iii. 8. laſt part.

——— *be pitiful, be courteous.*

A STUDIOUS and ſequeſter'd life, with all its advantages, is far from being favourable either to Pity or Courteſy. Where there are ſcarce any calamitous accidents to agitate the mind, or any objects of diſtreſs to attack the heart, the tender affections can have little or no exerciſe. This is not the leaſt of thoſe bad effects which are owing to the happieſt circumſtance of our happy ſituation. Nor will it be found at all more favourable to Courteſy, than it is to Compaſſion. That ſpirit of emulation ſo ſerviceable to the growth of Learning, ſtrikes at the very root of Civility: a ſpirit, which, for the ſake of its good effects, de-

ſerves to be cheriſh'd, but, on account of its miſchiefs, demands to be reſtrain'd.

THIS will be ſeen more clearly, as we proceed to conſider the uſes of Courteſy under the two views of its

Softening the ſeverity of Reaſon,

And

Correcting the exorbitancy of Self-love.

WHOEVER conſiders the temper and character of Reaſon, when it has long been intent on grave and important ſubjects, on deep reſearches, or abſtruſe ſpeculations, will find it to be that of reſerve and auſterity. Some degree of theſe qualities are obſervable in all ſtudious and contemplative men; and in many they prevail in ſo great a degree, as almoſt to alienate and eſtrange them from their own ſpecies. In that deep retirement which is choſen for the purpoſes of ſtudy, 'tis common to contract an unſociable humour, which never can be worne off; a ruſticity and roughneſs, which no after-poliſh can get the better of. Never indeed can the uſefulneſs

uſefulneſs and importance of the ſeverer Studies be render'd problematical by any abuſes or defects to which they may be liable, ſo long as it is poſſible to guard againſt them. But without ſome attention to this point, all that is gain'd on the ſide of reaſon, will probably be loſt on that of ſentiment. Yet whoever ſhould reflect how much our own happineſs and that of others depends on the due cultivation of this latter principle, would ſee little cauſe to triumph in any intellectual acquiſitions which are made at the expence of it. Much leſs if he farther reflected, that right affections, tho' they ſhould chance to be exerted in the purſuance of miſtaken notions, may be very meritorious: whereas the juſteſt notions without correſpondent affections, can never make him one jot the better. Far from theſe Manſions ſacred to Science, for ever far, be that Cynical and contemptuous ſpirit, which delights in diſcovering and expoſing defects and blemiſhes! Farther ſtill be that wanton and miſchievous paſſion for ſatyr and ridicule, which never entertains one part of ſociety, but at the expence of another! But fartheſt of all be that polemic

pride,

pride, which combats, not with a view of conviction, but of conqueſt; and triumphs, *but* to inſult! Wherever Learning takes this dangerous direction, the want of it would have been a bleſſing. But it muſt be confeſs'd, and ought to be lamented, that, without the leaſt tincture of theſe odious qualities, nay, with many uſeful and excellent endowments, it is common for perſons to be highly unacceptable merely from the want of that courteous, and obliging behaviour, which alone can give them their true value. It is the ſtrange deſtiny of ſuch perſons to be admir'd, reſpected, and — ſhunn'd! — admir'd and reſpected, for their great proficiency in virtue and learning; and ſhunn'd, for their perfect ignorance, or wilful neglect, of thoſe little regards and attentions, which, as long as men have any remains of ſenſibility, nothing can diſpenſe with. It would be wrong to indulge the leaſt ſuſpicion that there is any natural enmity between the Sciences and the Graces. The poſſibility of their entire union and harmony is out of all queſtion. But ſtill it will often happen, that the very talents, which enable men to ſhine

in ſolitude, ſhall hinder them from pleaſing in ſociety. That love of truth and accuracy, which guided them with ſo much ſucceſs in their philoſophical enquiries, by teaching them to diſtruſt their own conceptions; may greatly miſlead them in their ſocial intercourſe, where too little deference to the unimportant, or even erroneous, opinions of others would be highly prejudicial. Much accuſtom'd to reading and thinking, they are apt to examine the conduct and principles of thoſe with whom they live and converſe, with the ſame ſcrupulous and ſevere impartiality that hiſtory ſurveys the lives and actions of men in paſt ages. Thoſe lofty ideas of moral perfection, with which their minds were early poſſeſs'd, are apt alſo to breed in them a want of indulgence for every thing, which appears to fall ſhort of it. Hence, even the honeſt indignation againſt vice, and the juſt contempt of folly, when nouriſh'd and fed by reflection, will often grow intemperate, and ſometimes terminate in ſpleen and miſanthropy. Hence that paſſionate and ill-tim'd regard for reaſon and juſtice, which refuſes to yield to the neceſſity

of

of ſeeing men imperfect, and of making thoſe equitable allowances, which, after all, the beſt and the wiſeſt could ill do without. But ſay that any were exempt from failings, ſtill they would be under the ſame obligations to Courteſy, becauſe if they have any deſire to be ſerviceable, they muſt ſubmit to be agreeable; and it is impoſſible they ſhould ever be ſo, (unleſs from ſome ſtrange peculiarity of character) without complying with thoſe rules and modes of behaviour, which cuſtom and common conſent have adopted.

The truth is, that without the aſſiſtance of Courteſy, Wiſdom contracts ſuch a formidable mien, and Virtue carries ſuch a hoſtile appearance; that by the generality of men, who judge from appearances, what is moſt unlike *them*, will be thought moſt eligible. The ignorant and the vicious know how to improve the advantage, and draw over to their party many, who have no liking for their principles, by the ſkilful exertion of that familiar and attractive quality, which, as it never fails to brighten the beſt characters,

racters, ſo it ſerves to ſhadow and diſguiſe the worſt.

In concluding this article, let it here be noted, once for all, that as, without the aid and concurrence of this Quality, Reaſon, however active in the purſuit of knowledge, can never be ſucceſsful in the application of it; ſo neither can this Quality be truſted a moment longer than it is under the direction and controul of Reaſon. This ſingle remark will ſpare us the trouble of recounting and excepting againſt the numberleſs baſe and ſpurious arts which are employ'd to pleaſe, and which can be no more an objection to the principle we contend for, than ſophiſtry is to ſound reaſoning.

The great buſineſs of religion and philoſophy is to inform the underſtanding, and to regulate the will. But the laſt of theſe two points is the moſt difficult to be compaſs'd, from the undue prevalence of Self-love, and of particular paſſions. And there is always ſome danger, leſt the very methods employ'd to reſtrain their impetuoſity, ſhould deſtroy

their exiſtence. It is with the mind of man, as with ſome delicate piece of mechaniſm, whoſe deviations and irregularities none but a maſter-hand ſhould preſume to correct. Before therefore the ſelfiſh principles have had time to take root, it is neceſſary to cultivate with care and induſtry the contrary affections. It is certain that the growth of thoſe muſt be proportionably check'd and retarded, as theſe advance in ſtrength and vigour. The zeal for truth and liberty, the ſenſe of honour and dignity, the love of eſteem, the ſocial and ſympathetic ſpirit; — all theſe qualities are as properly a part of our nature, as any of the inferiour appetites and paſſions. Yet ſo great and general is the prevalence of Self-love, that ſeveral Writers have reſolv'd all human actions into the immediate, or remoter operation of this ſingle principle. That ſuch concluſions are haſty and erroneous, will indeed appear from applying them to the very Quality we are now conſidering. Courteſy, or the deſire to pleaſe, as it ſhews the value we ſet on the good opinion of others, will entitle us to their favour: their favour may be uſeful to us in various ways,

ways, and muſt be agreeable to us on all accounts: but neither is that contingency, or this certainty the neceſſary ground of the deſire, which often actuates the mind antecedent to reflection, and carries us, as it were, out of ourſelves by its own native force and energy. And this ſhews how able it is to oppoſe the encroachments of that principle, which, tho' a right tendency as conſider'd in the kind, is yet almoſt always ſo very faulty, as conſider'd in the degree. To correct its exorbitancy, and reduce it to its juſt meaſure, no Quality can be ſo proper, as that of Courteſy. Its conſtant attention to every art and method, which can be employ'd to render our own happineſs conſiſtent with that of others; and to conciliate theſe two objects whenever they happen to claſh, or be at variance; — its readineſs to ſtrengthen and ſupport benevolence, when weaken'd or overborne by the violence of interfering affections; —— its carefulneſs to hinder thoſe latent diſlikes and antipathies, which are engender'd by an oppoſition of intereſts, or a difference of tempers, from breaking out into open and avow'd enmities; —— its ſollicitude to make

up for the want of thoſe eſſential ſervices which few can perform, by thoſe kind regards, which are in every one's diſpoſal; —— all theſe properties declare the nature of this Quality, and muſt convince us that the heart which harbours ſuch a Gueſt, can never be poſſeſs'd by a mean and vicious Self-love. And from hence we may further diſcover, in what reſpects Courteſy agrees with Benevolence, and in what it varies from it. For as it is the peculiar excellence of the one, to ſtudy to ſerve men, tho' it cannot pleaſe them; ſo the other as generouſly delights in pleaſing, tho' it cannot ſerve them.

And now, may it not juſtly be matter of wonder, that of all the virtues belonging to the ſocial claſs, this only ſhould have been ſo little the ſubject of enquiry? The truth is, the frequent abuſe of it among thoſe, to whom it is indebted for nothing but its name, ſeems to have degraded it from its high rank as a moral excellence, and metamorhphos'd it into a mere Civil accompliſhment. Little notic'd, and leſs cultivated in any other view, it has rather been ſtudied as an art, than cheriſh'd

riſh'd as a principle, tho' none can be more truly founded in nature, more approv'd by reaſon, or of higher uſe and value to ſociety. For tho' it does not appear in any other paſſage of Scripture, but this ſingle one of St. Peter, to be recommended under the form of an injunction, yet we have ſeen, that, conſidered in its own nature, it has all the force of an obligation. In reality, what quality is there in the whole catalogue of natural excellences, the reaſonableneſs and neceſſity of which is more apparent, or for the exerciſe of which there can be more frequent opportunities or occaſions? Valour, generoſity, clemency, virtues indeed of a higher luſtre, can belong to a few only, whom Providence ſeems to have ſingled out from the maſs of mankind, and deſtin'd to be the inſtruments of its great deſigns. But there is no character in life from which this virtue is excluded. It is neceſſary to all, but eſpecially to thoſe, whoſe buſineſs it is to adviſe, or inſtruct. No one was more ſenſible of this truth, than the great Apoſtle of the Gentiles. With all his learning and eloquence, he knew how vain it was to think

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of convincing the underſtandings of men deeply poſſeſs'd with prejudice and falſehood, without firſt ſecuring an intereſt in their affections and good graces. This was the peculiar office of Courteſy; and its effects in preparing the moſt untoward diſpoſitions to receive the happy impreſſions of truth and religion, were never more ſtrongly exemplified than in his inſtructions, and in thoſe of his divine Maſter. To withſtand the utmoſt force of evidence and conviction, a little perverſeneſs might poſſibly ſuffice. But brutal and atrocious muſt be the temper of thoſe, who could remain inſenſible to ſuch winning and attractive graces, as attended the manifeſtations of divine power. When the tendereſt regards were added to the moſt important ſervices, and the deſire of pleaſing went along with the power of doing good; Benevolence and Courteſy, like aſſociates in command, each maſterly and potent in itſelf, but ſtronger by its union with the other, acquir'd a ſovereign ſway over the heart and affections.

Such are the inſtruments which truth employs to eſtabliſh her authority, and ſuch is the nature of that dominion to which ſhe aſpires. Yet that Church, which pretends to be the only true one, inſtead of winning men over to its opinions by a " pitiful and " courteous," forces its opinions upon them with a cruel and perſecuting ſpirit. Were there nothing elſe to invalidate its pretenſions, and diſcredit its Doctrines, this ſingle deviation from the fundamental rule of Chriſtianity, ſhould be ſufficient to drive from its communion every creature who will not ſubmit to renounce his reaſon. To little purpoſe do we read the Scriptures, if we continue ſtrangers to thoſe amiable qualities, which are eſſential to the Chriſtian character. To our great misfortune were we form'd for rational converſe and ſocial intercourſe, if at the great day of enquiry we are found wanting in any of thoſe offices, or regards, which are due from us to the meaneſt of our fellow creatures. On the contrary, an habitual attention to pleaſe thoſe, who are not in a condition to make

any returns; to merit their eſteem and approbation; and to contribute to their happineſs in the *leaſt inſtances*, as well as in the greateſt; this Quality, whatever be its name, is of ſuch a nature, as will not only endear us to *them*, but to the beneficent Author of all happineſs.

FINIS.